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AN INTRODUCTION TO WILLS AND
ADMINISTRATIONt
By PERcy BORDWELL*
F REEDOm of testamentary disposition has become second nature
to Americans and all others brought up under the influence
of Anglo-American law. While the testator cannot take his prop-
erty with him nor have rights after he is dead,' yet it is the
almost universal rule that by his will he may control the subse-
quent course of his property even to the extent of leaving his
children penniless.' So extreme a power of testamentary dis-
position is probably not to be found elsewhere,' and even in
Anglo-American law is, as legal history goes, of comparatively
recent date. Up until 1692 it was the law in the northern of
the two ecclesiastical provinces into which England is divided
that where a testator had wife and children he was entitled to
dispose of only one third of his goods and chattels, one third
going to the wife and the remaining third to his children.' And
such was the custom of London until 1724. Such is the law of
Scotland today.6 In the time of Edward I such was probably
*Professor of Law, State University of Iowa, Iowa City.
'This article forms ihe basis of a chapter in a volume on Wills (in-
cluding Administration) to be published by the West Publishing Company.
'See Salmond, Jurisprudence, 6th ed. 418. As to the legal status of
dead men, Salmond, Jurisprudence, 6th ed., 275.2For such limitations as there are on testamentary power in the United
States, see McMurray, Liberty of Testation and Some Modern Limitations
Thereon, (1919) 14 Ill. L. Rev. 96.3For restrictions on testamentary power in favor of the family in con-
tinental codes, see McMurray, (1919) 14 Ill. L. Rev. 110.
42 Pollock and 'Maitland, History of English Law, 2d ed., 34.
52 Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. L., 2d ed., 351.
62 Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. L., 2d ed., 348. Gardner, Origin
and Nature of the Legal Rights of Spouses and Children in the Scottish
Law of Succession, (1927) 39 Jurid. Rev. 209, 313, 434.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the general law in England. 7 As to land, there was a period of
some three hundred years" prior to the Statute of Wills in 15,109
when what was accounted land, that is, the legal freehold, could
not, except for custom, particularly in the boroughs,1" be devised
at all. For a century or more prior to the Statute of Wills, how-
ever, this rule against the devise of land had been evaded by
means of the use or trust." It was the dissatisfaction caused by
the attempt of Henry VIII to stop this evasion that was responsi-
ble for the definite authorization by the Statute of Wills of the
devise of the land itself.12
The extent to which this great freedom of testamentary dis-
position is made use of will depend primarily on two things,
first the extent to which the ordinary laws of succession in the
absence of a will are satisfactory and sufficient and second the
extent to which the testator's property is disposed of during his
life. If the laws of intestate succession become antiquated or
for some other reason run counter to public opinion, men will
desire to dispose of their property themselves. Thus when the
rule of primogeniture was established in England whereby land
went to the oldest son, the desire to provide for. the other chil-
dren must have been one of the compelling forces that led to
the evasion, by means of the use, of the rule that land could not
be devised. 13  And the rule of primogeniture which prevailed
quite generally in the original thirteen colonies" must have been
avoided for the most part by the will, for the fact that it ran
counter to public opinion is shown by its virtual abolition soon
after independence was gained." Furthermore, if most of a tes-
tator's property is disposed of during his life it is clear there
will he little left for him to dispose of by will. The extent and
relative importance of testamentary dispositions will depend on
how much there is left to dispose of. If, as in England, it is
customary to provide for the marriage and the fruits of the
marriage by marriage settlements' O most of the immediate ob-
72 Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. L., 2d ed.. 349.
82 Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. L., 2d ed., 26, 329.
"32 Hen. VIII. c. 1.
102 Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. L., 2d ed., 330.
114 Holdsworth's History of English Law, 3d ed., 419-421.
124 Holdsworth, Hist. of England. L., 3d ed., 464-65.
13Maitland, Equity 26.
14Morris, Primogeniture and Entailed Estates in America, (1927) 27
Col. L. Rev. 24.
15(1927) 27 Col. L. Rev. 25, 50-51.
l6As to the prevalence of strict settlements in England see the statement
INTRODUCTION TO WILLS
jects of a testator's bounty are likely to be provided for other
than by will and the importance of the will will be secondary.
If, as in the United States, marriage settlements are not com-
mon and advances to children during their lifetime rather excep-
tional, the disposition a man makes of his property at his death
will be of the first importance. The combination in the United
States, therefore, of great freedom of testamentary disposition
and rarity of family settlements other than by will give the will
an importance in the United States it probably does not possess
elsewhere.
The will is the mark of a comparatively advanced civilization.
It appears not to have been known to the German tribes in their
original habitats but after their wanderings to have been assimi-
lated by them under the influence of the church.'- The Anglo-
Saxons in England developed something that looks very much
like the modern will but the instruments that have survived are
almost exclusively the wills of the great and there is a question
as to whether this kind of a will ever became part of the com-
mon practice.' It was a common practice however to give land
after one's death 9 much, as at present, one may give land reserv-
ing a life estate.29  Such a transaction today is distinguishable
from a will in that it is not revocable but if the true will were
not possible today the grant with the reservation of a life estate
would be much more common even than it is and if the true
will never became the common practice in Anglo-Saxon times,
it is likely that the resort to this sort of a transaction was fre-
quent.
The immediate effect of the Norman Conquest on the law
of wills was probably not very great. However the Norman
Conquest did bring one change that was destined to affect vitally
not only the law of wills but the whole law of property. On
the continent of Europe the church had developed courts of its
own which handled matters like matrimony and divorce and a
great many other matters as well. In time there developed a
system of canon law which compared in extent and importance
with its pagan rival, the Roman or civil law.2 ' In fact the first
by the present Sir Arthur Underhill in, A Century of Law Reform 282.
'
7Maine, Ancient Law, 187.
182 Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. L 2d ed., 319-21. But see I Page,
Wills, 2d ed., 15 et seq.
'92 Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. L., 2d ed., 317-29.
-1 Tiffany, Real Property, 2d ed., 551-2.
21l Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. L., 2d ed., 112-1o.
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professional lawyers in England were canonists 2 and it was the
canonists of the time of Henry II and Henry III who as royal
judges gave the common law its great start.2 3 Prior to the Nor-
man Conquest, however, these church or ecclesiastical courts
were unknown in England. 24  It was the purpose of \\'illiam
the Conqueror to right this and he carried out his purpose.
2 5
The famous controversy between Henry II and Thonmas a
Becket 26 was as to the respective jurisdictions of the ecclesiasti-
cal courts so established by William the Conqueror. and the
king's courts which under Henry II had started on their remark-
able career in the development of the English common law.
One of the things that Henry II stipulated as coming witlin
the jurisdiction of his courts was the "lay fee," and he safe-
guarded this jurisdiction by providing a special remedy for de-
termining the preliminary question as to whether the land was
"lay fee" or not. In Henry II's time "lay fee" did not include
land held by frankalmoigne or "free alms" tenure. Juris diction
over such land was conceded to the ecclesiastical courts. " Be-
sides prohibiting the ecclesiastical courts from interfering with
the lay fee, the king's courts denied them jurisdiction over chat-
tels or debts except in matrimonial and testamentary causes.2 1
This concession to the ecclesiastical courts of jurisdiction over
testamentary causes indicates the important part the church
had in the development of the will. To die without a will prob-
ably meant that the deceased had died unconfessed.21 It was a
big step from this jurisdiction over wills to general jurisdiction
over distribution of the personal effects of the deceased. But such
general jurisdiction was recognized in the century following
Henry II, the thirteenth."' How this came about is not known.
Possibly there was a compromise," whereby the king's courts




261d. 124, 447-457, 2 id. 198.
271 Id. 246-247.
21,2 Id. 199.
291 Id. 128, 2 id. 356-359.
302 Id. 360.
312 Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. L., 2d ed., 333 suggest a com-
promise by which the ecclesiastical courts were to have jurisdiction over
the testament provided there were to be no testamentary gifts of land. This
compromise is suggested by the two writs of prohibition against the ec-
clesiastical courts meddling with the "lay fee" and with chattels or debts
except in matrimonial and testamentary causes. The extension of the
exception in the second of these two writs to intestate causes may well have
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were willing to concede jurisdiction over the succession to chat-
tels to the ecclesiastical courts in return for the assumption oil
their own part of jurisdiction over land held by frankalmoigue
tenure by the inclusion of such land under "lay fee." The only
land thus left to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts was
now "consecrated soil, the sites of churches and monasteries and
their churchyards" and possibly land given to churches at the
time of their dedicationL32 This concession to the ecclesiastical
courts in England of jurisdiction over wills and the succession
to property other than land is the more remarkable in that no
such jurisdiction was claimed for such courts by the general
canon law.33
This assignment of land and its succession to the king's
courts and of the succession to what we now know as personal
property to the ecclesiastical courts made deeper the breach which,
because of the fact that feudal law was land law, already ex-
isted between the law of land and the law of chattels. Feudalism
and the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts over the succes-
sion to goods and chattels are in large part responsible for the
great difference today between the law of real and the law of
personal property.
Already in Henry II's day the king's judges had set their
faces against the devise of land. They favored the alienability
of land in one's lifetime and held that the consent of the heir
was not necessary to such a transfer but apparently for fear of
ecclesiastical greed decided that land could not be transferred
at death.34  Not only was the Anglo-Saxon will rejected for
land but the grant to take effect at death, in effect, a grant with
a reservation of a life estate was placed under the interdict.
Great insistence was placed on livery of seisin, that is, the deliv-
ery of possession, in the conveyance of land and it was clear
that these gifts at death did not allow of liver' of seisin. 3 For
a while during the thirteenth century it seemed as if the devise
of land might be allowed where the land had been given one
with the express purpose that he should have power to devise
been a counter-weight to the inclusion of land held by frankahnoigne tenure
under "lay fee."
32 Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. L., 2d ed., 250.
z32 Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. L., 2d ed., 341; Holdsworth
and Vickers, Law of Succession, Testamentary and Intestate 13.
42 Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. L., 2d ed., 328 quoting Glan-
vill, VII, 1.351d. 328-329.
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it but after some hesitation the power was denied even in this
case.30 Until 1540 it remained the law in England, although
as we have seen, this had been circumvented for a century or
more by the use, that the freehold could not be devised except
for local custom, particularly in the boroughs. However, cer-
tain interests in land such as leaseholds, were treated as chattels,
they were called chattels real, and they could be disposed of by
will.
In the Roman law it had been the prime object of a will
to appoint an heir, one who should succeed to the testator's legal
personality, who should take his property and answer for his
obligations, one who, in short, should be the testator's universal
successor. There could be no will without the appointment of
an heir." At an early time it became apparent that the position
of the heir in the English law was to be quite different. Glan-
vill, in Henry II's time, declared it to be an established rule of
law that only God could make an heir.38 Heir here evidently
meant one who succeeds to a man's land on his death and Glan-
vill was emphasizing that this succession could not be determined
by will or in other words, that land could not be devised. His
statement of the rule fixed the meaning of the word heir in the
Anglo-Saxon law as one who succeeds to land by intestate suc-
cession. This is far removed from the meaning of heir in the
Roman law as one who was the universal successor of the de-
ceased and whose appointment was the primary purpose of a will.
Vith land going one way and chattels another, it was a puz-
zling question as to who should pay the testator's debts and
recover debts owed to him. At first this fell on the English
heir as it had fallen on the Roman heir. In Henry II's tine
the heir was bound to make good the testator's debts even though
the testator's estate was insufficient to pay them and he had to
make them good from his own property. In the following
century his liability was limited to the ancestor's property40
But that either the recovery of or liability for debts should fall
*on him was incongruous. He was not concerned with the distribu-
tion of the proceeds of debts owed to his ancestor nor was the
land coming to him from his ancestor the primary fund for the
36Id. 329-330,' 26-27.
37Buckland, A Text-Book of Roman Law 281. 293, 305. 312.
38Glanvill, VII. 1.
392 Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. L., 2d ed., 344; Glanvill VII. 8
402 Pollock andl Maitland, Hist. of Eng. L.. 2d ed., 345: Bracton, f. 61.
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payment of the ancestor's debts. The collection and payment
of debts naturally fell to the one charged with the distribution
of the money and chattels. This person was normally the
executor.
The executor was not, like the heir, of Roman origin. 1Iis
ancestry goes back to the early Germanic law.4 1 On the con-
tinent he was much used by the church to see that the testator's
legacies were paid. In England his functions early became much
broader than this42 for as the creature of the ecclesiastical courts
he became the successor to the testator's goods and chattels
and charged with their distribution. He did not, as we have
seen, at first succeed to the testator's legal personality so as to
sue and be sued in the testator's place but early in Edward I's
reign actions of debt were allowed in the king's courts for and
against executors and gradually by statute and by court action
this possibility of suing or being sued became so extended that
the executor came to be thought of as the testator's personal
representative. 3  The king's courts insisted on keeping to them-
selves jurisdiction over -these matters between the executors and
the creditors and debtors of the testator and an elaborate and
highly technical body of law resulted. On the other hand at
an early time it had become the duty of the executor to prove
the testator's will in the proper ecclesiastical court, to swear to
administer the testator's effects, to present an inventory of his
goods and to account there for his dealings. In case of mis-
conduct he could be removed and the administration turned over
to others in his stead."
When there was no will, though this occasion was rare,
there could be no executor in our modern sense and the ecclesi-
astical court had to administer the estate itself or appoint some-
one for that purpose.45 By a statute of 1357" those appointees
were to be from "the next and most lawful friends" of the de-
ceased. Henceforth such appointees came to be known as ad-
ministrators.4 7 The statute did much to put the administrator
appointed by the court in 'the same position as the executor
appointed by the testator. On his appointment the intestate's




45Id. 360-362.41St. 31 Edw. III, St- 1, c. 11.
4-2 Pollock and Maitland, Hist. of Eng. L., 2d ed., 301 n. 2.
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goods and chattels vested in him and he was the one to sue or
be sued as to the intestate's debts. Like the executor, the ad-
ministrator thus became the personal representative of the
deceased.
At the time of the Reformation, therefore, we find the
ecclesiastical courts with an established jurisdiction over the pro-
bate of wills, the appointment of administrators, the control of
and removal of both executors and administrators and the ad-
ministration of the personal estate. Debts owing to or owed
by the deceased, however, had to be sued for in the courts of
the King. The judges and the lawyers in the ecclesiastical courts
were ecclesiastics, learned in the canon and civil law but not in
the common law administered by the king's courts. The law
of wills and of succession to personal property at death, there-
fore, developed in quite a different atmosphere from that of the
common law. There was less of the canon law in this develop-
ment, however, than one might have expected. This was due
to the fact already noted that the jurisdiction over wills and the
succession to personalty was a peculiarity of the English ecclesi-
astical courts. The ecclesiastical courts on the continent had no
such jurisdiction. Therefore, the general canon law developed
no such definite body of law as to these matters as it did, for
instance, with regard to marriage and divorce. Accordingly in
so far as the judges and lawyers in the ecclesiastical courts were
influenced by their training it must have been to the civil law
that they turned for help in these matters rather than to the
canon law. There they might find light on such a matter as
the interpretation of a will. They showed a tendency to put the
executor in the place of the Roman heir."8 The procedure, how-
ever, was that of the canon law, with written depositions and
determinations of fact by the judge as opposed to the common
method of determination of facts by a jury. The rules of plead-
ing and evidence were accordingly very different from those
at common law.4"
With the Reformation the ecclesiastical courts ceased to look
to Rome for guidance and became the King's ecclesiastical courts.
However, such of their old law as was compatible with the new
conditions remained in force, the same substantive law, the same
48Thus the early writers laid it down that for a will, though not for a
codicil, an executor was necessary, just as an heir had been necessary in
the Roman law. See Holdsworth and Vickers, Law of Succession 31.49 See Langdell, Summary of Eq. PI. 1-26.
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procedure. The separation of the ecclesiastical lawycrs and
judges from those of the common law courts was as marked as
ever. The study of the canon law, however, was discontinued at
the universities and the study of the civil law encouraged in its
stead'; But though nominally the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical
courts remained the same they no longer had the power of the
general church behind them and fell victims to the writ of pro-
hibition which even in the days before the Reformation the com-
mon law judges had used to keep the courts Christian within
their statutory bounds. They were hampered at every turn in
their control over executors and administrators until finally the
probate of wills and the grant of administration was all that
was in fact left them. 5 As we shall see, the administration of
decedents' estates had in fact passed to the Court of Chancery.
The ecclesiastical courts continued to function as such in England
until 1857 when their de facto jurisdiction was turned over to
the newly-established Court of Probate' - which in turn was suc-
ceeded by the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the
High Court of Justice.5 3 The continuity and peculiarity of the
probate function in England has thus never been lost.
The common law courts were able to nullify the control of
the ecclesiastical courts over the administration of decedents'
estates but were precluded by their procedure from assuming
that control themselves. Their procedure was suitable for the
recovery of a sum of money or of property but for little else.
On the other hand the Court of Chancery, with a procedure mod-
elled largely after that of the ecclesiastical court,' was as well
fitted to exercise such control as the latter, and even better, and
at the same time was strong enough to hIoid its (,n with the
common law courts. It is not surprising therefore that the de-
cline of the ecclesiastical courts in the administration of decedent.-'
estates was marked by the gradual assumption of this jurisdic-
tion by the Court of Chancery. As a result the modern English
law of decedents' estates is largely the work of the Court of
Chancery. 5 It is an important head of equity jurisdiction. The
probate of wills and the grant of administration still continued
5OHoldsworth, History of English Law, 3d ed., 592.
51Holdsworth and Vickers, Law of Succession 19.
5220, 21 Vict. c. 77.
5336, 37 Vict. c. 66 s. 34.54Langdell, Summary of Eq. PI. 1.
55Holdsworth and Vickers, Law of Succession 19.
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to be the work of the ecclesiastical courts and their successors
but once the probate court had determined the validity and text
of a will, the construction of the will was for the court of equity
as incidental to the administration of the personal estate. This
split in jurisdiction is reflected today in the separate treatment
given the law of wills on the one hand and the law of adminis-
tration or of decedents' estates on the other. In taking to itself
this new jurisdiction equity did not purport to be changing the
law previously applied by the ecclesiastic courts. In so far as
that law had been affected by the Roman or civil law, it re-
mained so affected although the judges and lawyers who now
administered it in chancery were no longer civilians but men
trained in the common law.
Aside from the law of probate developed in the ecclesiastical
courts and the law of administration taken over and developed
by the Court of Chancery, it has already been noticed"' that a
considerable body of quite technical law had been developed in
the common law courts dealing with the survivorship of claims
to and against the executor or administrator and with the possi-
ble defenses to such claims. After the passage of the Statute
of W~ills of 1540 7 an additional body of law developed in the
common law courts about the will of land. The Statute of NVills
of 15401" authorized the devise of land held in socage tenure
and two-thirds of one's land held by military tenure but beyond
requiring that the will should be in writing left most of the legal
questions that were sure to arise with regard to wills of land
to be worked out by the courts."" The obvious thing would have
been to have allowed these new wills to be probated by the ecclesi-
astical courts just as these courts had long been accustomed to
probate wills of personality. In this way the question of their
validity and content would have been immediately determined and
the title of the devisee assured. But it was too much to expect
that the ecclesiastical courts would be allowed this power in their
decline when they had been denied it in their prime. The sacred
freehold was involved and matters pertaining to the title thereof
:' Supra, p. 7.
5 2 H-en. VIii. c. I.381d.
5"Some "doubts, questions and ambiguitities" were remo%d b) St. 34
and 35 Hen. VIII, c. 5 (1542). Thus it was provided by the latter .tatute
that no will of land should be good if made "by any woman covert, or
person within the age of twenty-one years, or by any person (c nonl sane
memory." Sec. xiv.
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the common law courts guarded as their peculiar prerogative.
As a consequence the proof of a will of land was handled by
the common law courts much like the proof of any other con-
veyance. And just as in the case of a deed, the chance 'for prov-
ing its validity might not come until years after it had gone into
effect and some controversy had arisen respecting it.66 In other
respects also it was treated like a conveyance rather than like
the fully-developed will. Unlike the will of personalty it could
not affect property acquired between its execution and the death
of the testator. 1  And just as the Court of Chancery would not
touch questions as to the validity or text of a will of personal
property, so they would not in general touch such questions as
to a will of real property but if questions of the kind had to be
determined in order for them to proceed with matters properly
before them, would send such questions to the common law courts
for determination in the usual common law manner by judge and
jury," Furthermore, unless a trust was involved, the construc-
tion of a will of land was normally a matter for the law courts
and even where a trust was involved, the construction of a limita-
tion of land was likely to be referred by chancery to the law
court.6 3 In the construction of wills, however, the law courts
departed from many of their rules applicable to deeds. They
were much less technical and much more inclined to have regard
to the intent.6 4
The rest of the history of wills and administration in Eng-
land may be told in brief. With the conversion of military into
socage tenures by St. 12 Car. II. c. 24 (1660) practically all
freehold land held in fee simple or for the life of another be-
came devisable. in 1677 came the well-known Statute of Frauds,""
by no means a mere wills act but of like importance in the law
of contracts and of conveyances inter vivos. From this statute
dates the modern law as to the formalities for the execution and
revocation of wills. Prior to this statute it is said that most
wills of personalty were made orally"6 and although wills of
6 5Report of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commission, 1832, pp. 26-27.
61Fourth Report of the Commissioners on the Law of Real Property,
1933, pp. 23-24.6
-'See Report of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commission, 1832, op. 26-27
and Fourth Report of the Commissioners on the Law of Real Property,
1833, OP. 34-38.
"1 Spence, Equitable Jurisdiction 517.
6,2 Jarman, Wills, 6th ed. pp. 2205-2208.
-1St. 29 Car. II, c. 3.
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-realty had to be in writing they did not have to be attested. The
Statute of Frauds made the will of land a formal document
but instead of requiring a seal as in the case of the common
law deed, adopted the civil law practice of attestation by sub-
scribing witnesses. The number of such witnesses was fixed at
three or four and in this respect a less stringent and rather ex-
ceptional provision of the Byzantine law seems to have been
followed6 7 rather than the general requirement of the classical
Roman law which was seven.6" The Statute of Frauds did not
change the law as to wills of personal property not exceeding
thirty pounds in value but restricted oral wills of personal prop-
erty above that amount in value to such as were made in the last
sickness of the deceased and with some exceptions at home.
69
These and other restrictions were so severe that oral, or, as
they were called, nuncupative, wills ceased to be of importance.
70




and provision was made against the revocation of written wills
of personalty by mere words.72
The Statute of Frauds required three or four "creditable"
witnesses for wills of land7" and as the least interest in a witness
such as having a debt owed by the testator charged on the land
destroyed the creditability of the witness, it became quite a com-
mon practice to discharge a legacy or debt before the proof of
the will with the thought that this would destroy the interest of
the witness at the time of the trial and that lack of interest at
that time would satisfy the statute. But it was held otherwise in
Holdfast d. Anstey v. Dosinj 7 and that creditability at the time
of the execution of the will was necessary. It was also denied
that the will would be good except as to the interest of the witness.
This decision resulted in St. 25 Geo. II c. 6 (1752) which as to
prior wills confirmed the old practice of discharging legacies
before the time of trial but as to subsequent wills declared the
61 Page, Wills, 2d ed., 404.
17 Report of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commission, 1832, 33, vouching
Allen v. Hill, (1726) Gilbert 257, 261.
esBuckland, A Textbook on Roman Law 285-286.69Sec. xix.
70Report of the Ecclesiastical Courts Commission, 1832, p. 30; Fourth
Report of the Commissioners on the Law of Real Property, 1833, p: 21,
voucing 2 Blackstone, Comm. 501.71Sec. vi.72Sec. xxii.
7 Sec. v.
74(1746) 2 Str. 1253.
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gifts to witnesses void and the witnesses in consequence credible.
That a debt owed to a witness was charged on the land by the
will, was. not to affect the creditability of the witness.
A much more comprehensive wills act than the Statute of
Frauds was the Statute of Wills of 1837. 3  This statute took
the provisions for the execution and revocation of wills of land
from the Statute of Frauds, modified them in view of the experi-
ence of the preceding hundred and fifty years and applied thein
as so modified equally to wills of real and personal property
except that it left the wills of personal property of soldiers and
sailors to the unwritten law.7 Among other changes the num-
ber of written witnesses was reduced from three to two.- The
Statute of 25 George II, c. 6 (1752) as to interested witnesses
was also incorporated and made more inclusiveTh If on the one
hand, however, the law applicable to wills of realty was extended
to wills of personalty, on the other, law previously applicable
only to wills of personalty was made to apply to wills of realty
also. The will of land became less like a common law convey-
ance7 9 and more like a true will in that it was made to affect
land acquired after the execution of the willi0  It was not till
1897 however that a will of land alone and in which no executor
was appointed was entitled to probate in England.-
The Statute of Wills of 1837" proved eminently satisfac-
:ory and remains substantially unchanged on the statute books
today. 3 In 1897 however, it was enacted 4 that land like chat-
tels should pass to the personal representative, that is, the execu-
tor or administrator. The personal representative thus became
a true universal successor like the heir of the Roman law. In
5St. 7 W. IV and 1 Vict. c. 26.7GSec. xi.
"Sec. ix.76Secs. xiv-xvii.
79See supra, pp. 10-11.80Secs. iii, xxiii-xxiv.
811 Jarman, Wills, 6th ed., 43-44. But by the Court of Probate Act.
1857, provision had been made for the probate in solemn form of a will
disposing of both realty and personalty. Id.
s-St 7 W. IV and 1 Vict. c. 26.
S3The requirement of the Statute of Wills, sec. IX. that the will shall
be "signed at the foot or end thereof" has been modified by 15 & 10 Vict.
c. 24 (1852) so as to avoid some of the unfortunate decisions under the
original act. See 1 Jarman, Wills, 6th ed., 110-112.
S4Land Transfer Act, 1897, 60, 61 Vict. c. 65. But under the Adminis-
tration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 Geo. V. c. 23, sec. 32 special executors are
provided as respects settled land.
85Supra, p. 6.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
the field of intestate succession the Administration of Estates
Act, 1925,80 has gone one step further. Except for entailed
property 7 it has abolished primogeniture and the heir, and sub-
stituted one method for the ultimate distribution of property
undisposed of by will whether that property be personal or real.88
Furthermore the Law of Property Act, 1925,89 has made entailed
property devisable.
The law of wills and administration in the United States
is largely a heritage from England and yet, especially in the
field of administration, there is much of native growth. The
ecclesiastical courts were not transplanted. They had become
an historical anomaly in England at the time of the settlement
of the colonies. Moreover there were no bishops in the colonies"0
and in England it was usually the bishop who, as ordinary, had
undelegated authority in ecclesiastical matters."' The ordinary
was the fountain-head of the ecclesiastical system and might
delegate his authority. In the absence of bishops in the colonies
the governor was quite generally considered as the ordinary."'
In New York in addition to his jurisdiction as ordinary, the gov-
ernor had exclusive jurisdiction where the deceased had effects
in more than one county. In this respect his jurisdiction was
like that of an archbishop in England, and his court, like the
archbishop's, was called the Prerogative Court."3  About 17,6 the
local delegates in each county in New York assumed the ecclesi-
astical title of surrogates."4 Some of these courts in the various
colonies still retain their ecclesiastical names"' but they are civil
8615 Geo. V. c. 23.
87 Sec. 45 (2).88Sec. 45 (1), 46.
80115 Geo. V. c. 20, sec. 176.
OThe first colonial see in British history was that of Nova Scotia
founded in 1787. 1 Burns, Ecclesiastical Law 9th ed., 415 xxxx.
913 Burns, Ecclesiastical Law 39; 4 Gray, Cases on Property, 2d cd., 411.
92As to New York, see the clear account of the early history of probate
and administration in the colony by Judge Daly in his opinion, while acting
as surrogate, in matter of Brick's Estate, (1862) 15 Abb. Prac. 12, 17-31;
as to New Jersey, see the opinion in In Re Coursen's Will, (1843) 4 N. J.
Eq. 408. Both of these opinions are given in extenso in Reppy and Tomp-
kins, History of Wills, 161-172, 175-177. That in the colonies the governor
and his council were quite commonly made a court of probate see Loyd,
Early Courts of Pennsylvania, c. V, and Daggett, Wills, in Two Centuries
Growth of American Law 174.
93Matter of Brick's Estate, (1862) 15 Abb. Prac. 12, 22-23.
"*Matter of Brick's Estate, (1862) 15 Abb. Prac. 12, 25.
95So of the Surrogate's Court in New York, of the Prerogative Court
in New Jersey and of the Court of Ordinary in Georgia. 4 (;ray, Cases
on Property, 2d ed., 413, 1 Woerner, The American Law of Administration.
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courts with which ecclesiastics have nothing to do and apparently
this has been so from the beginning.
The change from ecclesiastical to civil jurisdiction in probate
matters was therefore much earlier in the colonies than in England
and the break was much more pronounced. It was common for
wills to be probated and administration granted by officials who
were primarily administrative."' In Rhode Island it is still law
that "unless otherwise provided, the town councils shall be pro-
bate courts within their respective towns"' 7 and while. the county
courts that still exercise jurisdiction in probate natters prob-
ably have professional judges, they take us back to a time when
the functions of a county court were largely administrative.Y
At an early time, however, strong probate courts grew up
in the United States"" and while they looked to the old ecclesi-
astical courts for much of their law they were not hampered by the
same questions of jurisdiction that bothered those courts nor
were they familiar with the ecclesiastical procedure?10' Their
powers were almost exclusively statutory.'" -  As a consequence
the probate courts in this country have come much nearer to
exercising the full probate function, that is, the disposition of a
dece.dent's property at his death, than did any one of the English
courts among whom that function was divided.0 3 Especially
have probate courts in the United States regained that jurisdic-
tion over the administration of the decedent's personalty'"0
3d ed., 483. The Orphans' Court in Pennsylvania was named and modeled
not after any of the ecclesiastical courts but after the Court of Orphans of
the city of London. Loyd, Early Courts of Pennsylvania 223.
9GThe whole business of the Prerogative Court in New York "-as
managed for seventy years before the Revolution by the secretary of the
province and his deputy with little interference on the part of the governor
and with but little knowledge on their part respecting it." Matter of Brick's
Estate, (1862) 15 Abb. Prac. 12, 26.97Gen. Laws, 1923, c. 357 s. 1.
981 Woerner, Am. L of Administration, 3d ed., 483 n. 11.99Goodnow, Principles of the Administrative Law of the United States
184.
'
00Thus from 1799 to 1821 the powers of the surrogates in New York
were being constantly increased. See Matter of Brick's Estate, (1802) 15
Abb. Prac. 12, 29-30. The Orphans' Courts in Pennsylvania reached their
full dignity as courts of record in 1832. Loyd, Early Courts of Penn-
sylvania 239.
'O1But see 1 Woerner, .An. L. of Administration, 3d ed.. 509-510.
1021 Woerner, Am. L Administration, 3d ed., 482 says that probate
courts "can exercise such powers only as are directly conferred upon them
by legislative enactment, or necessary to carry out some power so conferred"
but this must be taken subject to what is said. id., 509-510.
1031 Woerner, Am. L. of Administration 3d ed., 480. 481. 513.
1041 Woerner, Am. L. of Administration. 3d ed.. 535-36.
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which in England the ecclesiastical courts lost to courts of
equity."' And in most states the adjudication of claims against
the deceased is given to the probate courts"' instead of being left
to the common law courts as in England.' ° A far-reaching
change in the matter of procedure is that in most states pro-
vision is made for trial by jury."0s
Probably in every county of the United States there is a
probate court." 9  Usually this is a separate court. Frequently,
however, the probate jurisdiction is conferred on the court of
general original jurisdiction" but if so, the law and equity and
probate jurisdictions are kept quite distinct. Each has its own
docket"' and the procedure in probate matters is very in-
formal.
1 1 2
In some jurisdictions in the United States land is made to
pass to the executor or administrator in the same way as per-
sonalty," 3 as is now the case in England."' In these jurisdic-
tions therefore the personal representative has become a universal
successor. In other states the personal representative is entitled
to the possession and control of the real estate and of the rents
and profits thereof during the term of the adninistration."t
More commonly, however, land passes directly to the heir or
devisee as it (lid formerly in England with power in the probate
or other court to subject it to the decedent's debts.""
Almost everywhere in the United States the characteristics
"'5Supra, pp. 9-10.
1061 Woerner, Am. L. of Administration, 3(d ed., 522, 2 id. 1264-1267.
"'13y these means the common law right of preferring one creditor of the
same class over another; the right of retainer for the administrator's own
debt; the artificial system of pleading the existence of a debt of superior
dignity in bar of an inferior one, or plene administravit, or rien ultra in
case of insufficiency of assets; the marshalling of assets on securities In
courts of equity; the technical distinction between pleas admitting or deny-
ing assets; between judgments de bonis propriis and de bonis intestatis or
testatoris, and judgments quando acciderint, as well as the complicated
formalities of enforcing judgments against executors and administrators,
are swept away." Id. 1264-1265.
107See supra, p. 10.
1081 Woerner, Am. L. of Administration, 3d ed., 508.
1094 Gray, Cases on Property, 2d ed., 413.
1101 Woerner, Am. L. of Administration, 3d ed., 483.
"'As to the probate docket and probate record in Iowa see Iowa, Code
1927, sec. 11841, 11842.
"'This is true of probate proceedings in general. See 1 Woerner, ,.
L. of Administration, 3d ed., 504, 505.
132 Woerner, Am. L. of Administration, 3d ed., 1118-1119.
114See supra, p. 13.
"' 2 Woerner, Am. L. of Administration, 3d ed., 1121, 1117-1119.
11(3 Woerner, Am. L. of Administration, 3d ed., 1594.
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that made the old English will of land look in some respects
more like a conveyance than a will'1 7 have disappeared. Like
the will of personalty the will of land is subject to probate 1  and
usually with the same conclusive effects." 9  And like the will
of personalty the will of land may affect property acquired after
the making of the will.1
20
The Statute of Frauds12 1 unlike St. 25 Geo. II. c. 6 (1752)
as to interested witnesses22 was not made expressly applicable
to the colonies but its influence on American law would probably
not have been much greater had it been made so applicable."'
The phraseology of these statutes as regards the execution and
revocation of wills rather than the phraseology of the Statute
of Wills is pretty closely followed in about two-thirds of the
states. The changes made in these matters by the Statute of
Wills are reflected in the statutes of many of the remaining states.
Thus in thirty-three of the states' 24 there are provisions similar
in phraseology to those of the Statute of Frauds as to nuncupative
wills while in only six states' 2- is the statutory law on nuncul)ative
wills the same as that of the Statute of Wills. And in enumerat-
ing the acts of revocation it is the Statute of Frauds that is
followed rather than the Statute of Wills. 2 6 On the other hand
the number of witnesses to a will has been reduced from three
to two as in the Statute of Wills except in the old colonial states
of Connecticut, Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
South Carolina and Vermont. 1 -7 Likewise there has been the
same assimilation of wills of realty and wills of personalty a,
in the Statute of Wills by making the requirements for their
execution and revocation in general the same"' and by extend-
ing the efficacy of wills to after-acquired land.' There has
"-See supra, pp. 10-11.
11S2 Woerner, Am. L. of Administration, 3d ed., 707.
1192 Woerner, Am. L. of Administration, 3d ed., 772-73.
120(1929) 14 Ia. Law Rev. 187-189.
121(1677) S C. 29 Car II. c. 3.
1 22Supra, pp. 12-13.
123As to its express or tacit adoption in the colonies, see Daggtt in
Two Centuries Growth of American Law 172 n. 1.
1-24(1928) 14 Ia. L. Rev. 31.
12 5Maryland, Massachusetts, New York, Rhode Island, Virginia and
West Virginia, (1928) 14 Ia. L. Rev. 28.
126(1929) 14 Ia. 288-89.
127(1928) 14 Ia. L_ Rev. 16-17. But the Vermont provision has found
its way into the Philippine Islands and the Canal Zone. Id.
1-28(1928) 14 Ia. L Rev. 8-9.
129See supra, n. 120.
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also been a tendency in the United States to follow tile provisions
of the Statute of Wills which were innovations rather than mere
modifications of the Statute of Frauds and noticeably so the
provision guarding against a lapse on the death of the beneficiary
before the testator' 30 which has been given a great extension.",
Noticeable innovations in the United States have been the
holographic will, in the handwriting of the testator, which is not
required to have any written witnesses in nineteen states'3 2 and
the provision for the omitted child which exists in a majority
of jurisdictions' 33 and the provision for the child born after
the making of the will which is almost universal. 3'
In most states the wills acts do not exceed in scope that of
the Statute of Wills.'35 Georgia, however, has codified some of
the old unwritten law and in seven states, California, Idaho,
Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota and Utah
there are substantially identical codes, except that in Idaho many
of the provisions which cover the otherwise unwritten law are
omlitted1.131
The only one of the states not to follow the English tradi-
tion as to wills is Louisiana. Her law is based on the Code
Napoleon' 3 and is therefore of Roman Law ancestry. The
familiar phraseology of the Statute of Frauds is lacking. As
many as seven witnesses are sometimes required. 38  Wills, other
than holographic, are divided into closed and open wills depend-
ing on the question of whether the contents are to be kept secret
as is the custom with common law wills or are disclosed to the
witnesses. For a closed will the services of a notary are called
in.13 9 Testamentary power is not stated in the sweeping terms
of the Statute of Wills nor of the statutes of most of the other
states. There are "forced heirs" who cannot be deprived of their
shares without due cause shown. 140 Unlike the old Roman law,
however, the institution of an heir as a universal successor is
1:;oSt. 7 W. IV & 1 Vict., c. 26 (1837), sec. xxxiii.
"3'See (1929) 14 Ia. L. Rev. 428-432.
32And in Alaska and Porto Rico. All the states are southern or
western. See (1928) 14 Ia. L. Rev. 25-26.
1.13(1929) 14 Ia. L. Rev. 174-77.
134(1929) 14 Ia. L. Rev. 290-98.
135(1928) 14 Ia. L. Rev. 4.
336(1928) 14 Ia. L. Rev. 4-5.
"3Saunders, Lectures on the Civil Code, viii.
138(1928) 14 Ia. L. Rev. 17.
139(1928) 14 Ia. L. Rev. 10-11.
140(1929) 14 Ia. L. Rev. 195.
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not necessary to a testament 14 1 though provision for such insti-
tution is made. 14 2 In Porto Rico the old Spanish code is in force
with modification and such code is supplementary law in the
Philippine Islands. The Spanish code, too, traces its ancestry
back to the old Roman law but it presents many sharp contrasts
with the Louisiana code. The arrangement is different and the
number of provisions very much greater. 14 3  The law in the
United States and its dependencies offers an excellent opportunity
for comparative study.
141Ja. Rev. Civ. Code (Merrick 1925) Art. 1570.
1'2La. Rev. Civ. Code (Mferrick 1925) Arts. 1606-11.
143(1928) 14 Ia. L. Rev. 5.
